In March this year, the Court of Justice of the European Union decided a case brought by a Bulgarian trans woman living in Italy. For almost a decade, Bulgaria had refused to change the sex and name on her civil status record. In 2023 its highest court made the refusal universal. The Court of Justice said that was incompatible with EU law.
Since then I have been asked one question more than any other: if the UK rejoined the EU, would there be redress for what followed the Supreme Court’s April 2025 ruling?
It is a fair question, and it deserves a straight answer. The short version is no, not redress. But membership would change the ground we stand on, and it would change it in a particular place. This piece sets out where, and why.
What the Court actually decided
The case is Shipova (C-43/24, judgment of 12 March 2026). It is worth reading the judgment itself rather than the headlines, because its scope is precise.
- The holding. Article 21 TFEU (the right of EU citizens to move and reside freely) and the identity-document provision of the Free Movement Directive (Directive 2004/38, Article 4(3)), read with Article 7 of the Charter (private and family life), preclude national law that does not allow a state’s own national, who has exercised free movement, to amend the gender data on their civil status record ([56] and the operative part).
- Why. A mismatch between how a person lives and what their identity documents say forces them to “dispel doubts as to [their] identity”, and that hinders free movement ([44]). The applicant described “considerable inconvenience” with airline and hotel staff and at border checks ([42]).
- The Strasbourg baseline. The Court adopted the European Court of Human Rights’ position that states must provide “a clear and foreseeable procedure for legal recognition of gender identity… in a quick, transparent and accessible manner” ([51]), and that recognition “cannot be made conditional on surgical treatment that is not desired” ([50]).
- The line that will travel furthest. “To tolerate discrimination based on the difference between biological sex and gender identity would be tantamount, as regards a transgender person, to a failure to respect the dignity and freedom to which he or she is entitled” ([54], drawing on P v S, 1996).
- Courts must not hide behind a higher court. A national court must set aside a constitutional court’s interpretation that contradicts EU law as the Court of Justice has interpreted it ([58]–[64]).
Two things the judgment does not do. It does not decide what “sex” means in EU equality legislation. And it repeats that personal status remains a matter for member states, provided they respect EU law when they exercise that competence ([37]).
Why there would be no redress for 2025
EU law can make a state pay damages for breaching it. But that liability depends on EU law having bound the state when the breach happened. In April 2025 it did not bind the UK. Rejoining would apply EU law from the date of accession, not backwards. Even inside the EU, a state is liable for a decision of a court ruling at last instance only in the exceptional case where that court has “manifestly infringed the applicable law” (Köbler, [53]). It is a high bar, set with the legal certainty of final judgments in mind.
So the honest answer to “would there be redress?” is no. Anyone telling trans people otherwise is selling a hope the law cannot deliver, and we have had enough of those.
What would change: a likely sequence
This is a scenario, not a forecast. It assumes full membership, the only route on which Shipova applies in full.
1. Before joining: the real pressure point. Accession negotiations test a candidate’s law against the whole body of EU law, fundamental rights included. The biological reading of “sex” in the Equality Act, and the regulator’s guidance built on it, would sit awkwardly beside [54]. Fundamental-rights standards rarely attract opt-outs. The most likely outcome is political: pressure to amend the Equality Act before accession, rather than a court case afterwards. If change comes, I expect it to come here, through Parliament.
2. Joining day: documents change less than people expect. The UK already has a recognition route in the Gender Recognition Act 2004, and the UK is still bound by the European Convention on Human Rights, which already sets the “quick, transparent and accessible” standard. Two points of friction are likely:
- Recognition obtained elsewhere. In Mirin (C-4/23, 2024), the Court held that a member state must recognise a change of gender identity its national lawfully obtained in another member state (Mirin, Grand Chamber, operative ruling; restated in Shipova at [38]). Today the UK offers a separate application route for people recognised in approved overseas countries. Membership would point towards recognising those changes without a fresh application.
- Is the UK process quick and accessible enough? It asks for a medical diagnosis, two years’ evidence and a panel decision. So far as we are aware, neither Strasbourg nor Luxembourg has required self-declaration, so this is a contested edge, not a certainty. Delay is the weaker flank.
3. The first test case: work. Picture a Spanish national, legally recognised as a woman in Spain, working for a public body in England. She is refused the women’s changing room under a policy based on the April 2025 ruling. As an EU citizen working here, she could rely on the recast equal-treatment Directive (2006/54) directly against a public employer. The tribunal would have to read the Equality Act consistently with it where possible. EU case law since 1996 treats discrimination arising from gender reassignment as sex discrimination, and Shipova ([53]) restates that national law cannot use the absence of recognition to block a trans person from an EU-law right. A blanket exclusion would be hard to defend. Whether separately designed facilities can be justified case by case is not a question we are aware of the Court of Justice having decided, and it would likely be referred to it.
4. Services: back to justification. The goods and services Directive (2004/113, Article 4(5)) expressly allows a service to be provided to one sex where that “is justified by a legitimate aim and the means of achieving that aim are appropriate and necessary”. So membership would not outlaw single-sex provision. It would make blanket rules fragile, and reward services that can show their reasoning, their evidence and their alternatives.
Not every route back is the same
| Route | Would Shipova apply? |
|---|---|
| Full EU membership | Yes. It rests on EU citizenship and the Charter. |
| EEA, Norway-style | Largely no. Free movement of workers returns, but EU citizenship and the Charter do not. |
| A bespoke mobility deal | Only to the extent the treaty provides. |
The part of the UK where this matters now
Northern Ireland is the exception to “this is all hypothetical”. The Equality Act does not extend there. Under Article 2 of the Windsor Framework, the UK must not let certain rights fall below their pre-Brexit level, including rights under the EU equality directives listed in its Annex 1. There are six, including the goods and services, employment and social security directives. In Dillon ([2026] UKSC 15, [118]), the Supreme Court agreed with both parties that Article 2 might operate together with a directly effective provision of one of those directives to give rise to a right that can be enforced in domestic courts. It said so in passing: the directives were not in issue in that case. Whether EU law displaces the April 2025 reading of “sex” in Northern Ireland is now before the High Court in Belfast. The judge has listed the cases for the first two weeks of December 2026.
Shipova was decided on free movement, not on those directives. But [53] and [54] restate the Court’s equality case law, including Richards (2006), a ruling on the social security directive that Annex 1 lists. Whether courts in Northern Ireland must follow CJEU judgments given after Brexit is itself a contested question, but the older line of cases those paragraphs rest on was decided while the UK was a member.
What this means now
For organisations in Great Britain, nothing in Shipova changes the law you operate under today. The April 2025 ruling is binding, and the regulator’s code is in force. What Shipova does is remind us that the reading of “sex” we now live with was reached after the UK left the EU. It is not the only coherent reading of equality law, and our nearest neighbours reached a different one.
That matters for how you design. The organisations that would cope best with any future change, in law or in politics, are the ones already making single-sex and separate-sex decisions on evidence and proportionality, not by blanket rule. Those are exactly the decisions that hold up under any of the frameworks set out above.
For trans people, I will not offer false comfort. There is no back-payment coming from Brussels. But there is something worth holding on to. The EU’s highest court has said, in plain words, that tolerating discrimination based on the difference between biological sex and gender identity fails to respect dignity and freedom. The principle behind those words goes back to P v S in 1996, a case referred by the Industrial Tribunal in Truro. It shaped UK law throughout our membership, and gender reassignment remains a protected characteristic under the Equality Act today. Across most of our continent, the wider principle is the law now. Arguments of that weight do not go away.
Decisions you can stand behind
The law on sex and gender has changed more than once in twenty years, and it may change again. None of that changes what you owe the people affected by your decisions today.
The Trans Inclusion Toolkit helps you make decisions you can stand behind in a changing legal and social landscape. It helps you make sure you are doing the right thing: grounded in evidence and proportionality, and made with dignity and respect for everyone affected. It supports your judgement; it does not replace legal advice, and it cannot undo what has already happened.
Whatever the law says next, people will remember how you treated them today.
ILGA-Europe’s write-up of the judgment prompted this piece. The analysis is our own, from the judgment text.
This is a practical governance commentary, not legal advice. The scenario above is informed speculation about a political possibility, not a prediction. Where a decision may need legal sign-off, discuss it with a solicitor or barrister.