Peggie v Royal College of Nursing is a Scottish Employment Tribunal judgment, sent to the parties on 2 November 2026. A nurse brought claims against her trade union, alleging that it treated her less favourably because of her gender-critical belief. The tribunal dismissed the claims.
It is a different case from Peggie v Fife Health Board, which concerned her employer and a changing room. This one asked how a union responded when she sought its help.
It is a first-instance decision: not binding on other tribunals, decided on its facts, and open to appeal.
What was the claim?
The only complaint was direct discrimination because of philosophical belief, brought against a trade organisation (Equality Act 2010, ss.13 and 57) [1], [96], [98]. The union accepted that her belief — that biological sex is real, important, immutable and not to be conflated with gender identity — is a protected philosophical belief under s.10 [2].
She said the union treated her less favourably by [3]:
- not advising her, in an early call after her suspension, that she might have a claim against her employer or a colleague, and not referring the matter to its solicitors;
- refusing legal assistance with a second claim; and
- not seeking in full, or circulating to members, the assurances she asked it to obtain from her employer about single-sex facilities, belief and the right to discuss and organise.
What the tribunal decided
All three complaints failed [133]. For each decision, the tribunal asked the question direct discrimination always turns on: why did this person act as they did, consciously or subconsciously? [110], [111]. Each complaint failed on its facts:
- The early call. The main reason was that the official did not know of the belief [119]–[120]. In any event, he focused on the suspension and planned fuller advice once he had the facts, which was his standard approach with anyone recently suspended [120.1], [120.3]–[120.4].
- Legal assistance. The decision-maker refused because she had already taken independent legal advice on the new complaint, which was closely linked to her existing claim. This was consistent with 18 years of practice, and he would have decided the same for someone without her belief [41], [46], [124]–[126].
- The assurances. Two of the three assurances she asked for were sought, so that part of the complaint failed [128]. Where the third request was narrowed, and members were not copied, the reason was that the officer saw her role as supporting one member [129]–[131].
Four points for organisations
1. An organisation’s culture is not proof of an individual’s motive. Much of the evidence concerned the union’s alleged institutional position, including guidance, articles, flags and merchandise [107], [64]–[90]. The union denied holding any such position [108]. The tribunal held that this did not have to be decided: even if such a culture existed, it would not, of itself, show that the individual decision-makers acted because of the claimant’s belief [109]. Such material can be supporting evidence, but it must be used with care, and there is no “doctrine of transferred malice” [110.1], [115].
2. A decision-maker must know about the belief. The official in the early call did not understand her to be expressing a protected philosophical belief. He heard discomfort about a colleague using a changing room, linked to a news story. A protected characteristic cannot be the reason for treatment if the decision-maker is unaware of it [119].
3. A claim cannot rest on the organisation’s own beliefs. To the extent the claim said the union acted because of its own institutional belief, it could not succeed. Direct discrimination protects a person from being treated less favourably because of their belief, not because of the alleged discriminator’s [114]–[115].
4. A training gap does not, by itself, show motive. The claimant argued the official lacked training to recognise that her objection might be a manifestation of a protected belief. The tribunal held that matters a person was unaware of could not have influenced them [120.2].
What the judgment did not decide
Peggie v RCN did not decide:
- whether any organisation holds an institutional belief, or whether that is lawful;
- anything about who may use single-sex facilities (that was the subject of the Fife case);
- that a union or employer can never be liable for belief discrimination;
- whether the first complaint was brought in time [122]; or
- that training and clear guidance do not matter. In our view, they still shape how decisions are made and recorded.
What it means in practice
These points are our governance reading of the judgment, not findings of the tribunal.
- Record the reason for each decision when you make it. The tribunal accepted each decision-maker’s account of their reasons as credible. For the legal-assistance decision, those reasons were written down at the time and matched long-standing practice [46], [124]–[126].
- Apply the same approach to everyone in the same circumstances. Evidence of a standard approach supported the tribunal’s conclusion that a hypothetical comparator would have been treated the same [120.3]–[120.4], [126].
- Treat organisational messaging and individual decisions as separate questions. The tribunal examined what each decision-maker knew and why they acted, not the organisation’s public stance [109], [111].
- Help staff recognise when a concern may engage a protected characteristic. Knowledge matters, and an early, careful question can make the difference.
This article explains the judgment for governance purposes. It is not legal advice; take advice on your own situation.