For Women Scotland Ltd v The Scottish Ministers [2025] UKSC 16
The UK Supreme Court unanimously held that references to 'sex' and related terms ('man', 'woman') in the Equality Act 2010 refer to biological sex, not…
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- Citation
- [2025] UKSC 16
- Jurisdiction
- England, Wales, Scotland & Northern Ireland
- Year
- 2025
- Status
- Primary
- Certainty
- Settled
In brief
The UK Supreme Court unanimously held that references to 'sex' and related terms ('man', 'woman') in the Equality Act 2010 refer to biological sex, not legal sex as modified by a GRC under the Gender Recognition Act 2004. For sex discrimination purposes, a person with a GRC in the female gender does not come within the definition of 'woman' in section 11 (para 266), while remaining legally of the acquired sex for the purposes to which section 9(1) of the Gender Recognition Act 2004 applies (para 264). The Court applied the biological reading to the sex-based provisions it examined, including the single-sex and separate-services exceptions in Schedule 3 and the Public Sector Equality Duty (paras 211–221, 238–244).
Key provisions
- para-264 — Sex in EA2010 means biological sex : The Supreme Court held that the words sex, woman and man in sections 11 and 212(1) of the Equality Act 2010 mean "biological sex, biological woman and biological man" (para 264), biological sex being the Court's term for the sex of a person at birth (para 7), not legal sex as modified by a Gender Recognition Certificate.
- para-264 — A GRC does not change a person's sex for EA2010 purposes : Section 9(1) of the Gender Recognition Act 2004 gives a full GRC effect for all purposes, but section 9(3) makes that subject to other enactments: it applies where the terms, context and purpose of the other enactment show that it does, because of a clear incompatibility or because its provisions are rendered incoherent or unworkable by the section 9(1) rule (para 156). The Court held that the Equality Act 2010 makes provision within section 9(3) that disapplies section 9(1) for "sex", "woman" and "man", so that for sex discrimination purposes a GRC does not change the sex a person is treated as having under the Act, while the holder remains legally of the acquired sex for the purposes to which section 9(1) applies (para 264).
- paras-213-221 — Single-sex exceptions (EA2010 Schedule 3 paragraphs 26–28) operate by reference to biological sex : Single-sex exceptions under EA2010 Schedule 3 paragraphs 26–28 operate by reference to biological sex, not certificated sex: paragraph 26 at para 213, paragraphs 27 and 28 at paras 218 and 220–221 (summarised at para 265(xiv)).
- paras-238-244 — The PSED (s.149) duty regarding sex relates to biological sex : The Public Sector Equality Duty under s.149 regarding sex relates to biological sex (para 238 describes the duty; the reasoning is at paras 239–244, summarised at para 265(xv)). Public authorities must have due regard to the needs of people grouped by biological sex.
- para-199 — Gender reassignment protection under s.7 remains a protected characteristic : The Act recognises sex and gender reassignment as distinct and separate bases for discrimination and inequality, with separate protection for each (para 199). The Court said its biological reading would not have the effect of "disadvantaging or removing important protection under the EA 2010 from trans people (whether with or without a GRC)" (para 248), and that it does not remove or diminish the important protections available to trans people with a GRC (para 264): gender reassignment under s.7 remains a protected characteristic in its own right.
When relevant
The leading Supreme Court authority on the meaning of sex in the EA2010. Directly relevant whenever: single-sex services or facilities are discussed, Schedule 3 exceptions are invoked, PSED assessments are conducted, organisations change rules post-2025 about women-only spaces or roles, the biological sex vs legal sex distinction matters, GRC holder rights are assessed, sport participation is restricted by sex, membership organisations restrict eligibility, any proportionality assessment involves sex-based or gender-reassignment-based restrictions. Creates a dual-analysis requirement: assess both sex grounds AND gender reassignment proportionality. Applies to ALL sectors: employment, services, sport, education, healthcare, political parties, charities, voluntary associations.
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Related authorities
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- Haynes v Thomson and Others [2025] EWCC 50
- Hutchinson & Others v County Durham and Darlington NHS Foundation Trust (Case No. 2501192/2024 & Others)
- Kelly v Leonardo UK Limited (Case No. 8001497/2024)
- Lockwood v Cheshire and Wirral NHS Foundation Trust [2025] ET 2401211/2024
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