R (on the application of Sex Matters) v National Police Chiefs' Council and Chief Constable of the British Transport Police [2026] EWHC 1954 (Admin)

In brief

The Administrative Court (Linden J) dismissed Sex Matters' judicial review of police guidance on strip searches of transgender detainees [96]. The National Police Chiefs' Council's interim guidance of May 2025 and the British Transport Police's interim guidance of 30 June 2025 allow a transgender detainee to be strip searched by an officer of a different biological sex if the detainee, the officer carrying out the search and an authorising officer all consent, and the search reverts to a same-sex statutory search if anyone withdraws consent [3], [15], [21], [24]-[28]. The one ground decided was whether guidance that relies on consent is ultra vires section 54(9) of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, which provides that the constable carrying out a search shall be of the same sex as the person searched [5], [9]. The court held that, in principle, at common law a detained person may express a preference to be strip searched by an officer of a different biological sex and an officer may agree [88], and that sections 54 to 54B, which codify the coercive search powers of the police, did not extinguish that possibility [91]-[95]. The conclusion is limited to strip searches which, absent consent, are authorised by sections 54 to 54B and Annex A to PACE Code C [93]. The court did not decide the effect of a Gender Recognition Certificate [11], intimate searches under section 55 [93] or any argument under the Human Rights Act 1998 [80], [100]. It assumed, without deciding, that the parties' agreed reading of For Women Scotland, under which 'sex' in this context means biological sex whether or not a person holds a certificate, is correct [5], [11].

Key provisions

• para-5 — The guidance challenged and the single ground decided : Per [3]-[5], the claim challenged the NPCC's interim guidance on searching by transgender officers and the searching of transgender detainees (May 2025) and the BTP's interim transgender and non-binary search guidance (version 9, 30 June 2025). The guidance applies to strip searches, meaning 'More Thorough Searches' and 'Exposing Intimate Parts' searches, but not to intimate searches under section 55 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 [4], [93]. The guidance provides that, if the suspect and the officer both agree, a transgender person may be strip searched by an officer of a different biological sex, whereas section 54(9) provides that the searching constable 'shall be of the same sex as the person searched', and sections 54A and 54B are to essentially the same effect [5]. Per [6]-[9], three grounds were originally pleaded: ground 3 (Annex L to PACE Code C) was not pursued [7], ground 2 (the public sector equality duty) was withdrawn by consent on 18 May 2026 [9], and permission had been given on the papers by Johnson J on 5 January 2026 for grounds 1 and 2 [9]. The agreed issue was whether the guidance is ultra vires section 54(9) insofar as it relies on consent as a lawful basis for opposite-sex strip searching [9].
• para-20 — Safeguards built into the consent arrangements : Per [15]-[33], the NPCC guidance requires the written consent of the authorising officer, the person detained and the officer or officers conducting the search [15]; an officer or member of staff can refuse to search a trans detainee with no career detriment, a lawful order cannot be given to search a trans detainee, and if consent is retracted or no willing officer is found within a reasonable time the search is completed by officers of the same biological sex [16]-[19]. The BTP guidance describes a 'Consensual Search' that can be carried out only where the PACE criteria for the search are met, requires an inspector to be notified of a consensual search exposing intimate parts, and provides that consent can be withdrawn by anyone at any time, whereupon the officer reverts to the statutory power [23]-[29]. Per [20], the court considered these provisions tend to show that the risk of pressure on female officers to carry out strip searches on persons of a different sex is not as high as the claimant's evidence suggested, and that the guidance builds in protections for the person searched.
• para-88 — Consent to a strip search at common law : Per [85]-[88], the court accepted the defendants' first three propositions. The general rule is that physical interference with another person's body is lawful if the person consents, subject to limited public interest exceptions [85]. Provided the consent is genuine and the search is lawful in all other respects, the public interest does not require the law to refuse to recognise a person's consent to a strip search by an officer of a different sex in accordance with their preference, and the effect is to mitigate the distress the detained transgender person may feel [86]. Custody does not make a person incapable of giving valid consent, but whether they have genuinely done so depends on the evidence and all the circumstances; the safeguards in sections 56 to 58 of the 1984 Act tend to support the possibility of genuine consent [87]. Per [88], in principle at common law a detained person may express a preference to be strip searched by a person of a different biological sex, and an officer may agree to do so. Per [75]-[77], the defendants accepted that the logic of their argument is not confined to transgender people and has wider consequences for 'contracting out' of the Act, and the court explored a narrower waiver analysis on which the defendants were not enthusiastic.
• para-91 — Part V of the 1984 Act codifies coercive powers; the same-sex guarantee applies to them : Per [89]-[92], Parliament is presumed not to change the common law unless it clearly indicates that intention expressly or by necessary implication. Part V of the 1984 Act is concerned with the codification of the coercive powers of the police, and section 53 abolished the pre-existing coercive search powers [91]. The effect of sections 54(9), 54A(7) and 54B(6) is that the same-sex guarantee applies to the exercise of those coercive powers, and Annex A to PACE Code C is the same [92]. The statute is not concerned with the capacity of officers, as citizens, to enter consensual arrangements with members of the public, so the common law ability to do so is not inconsistent with, or repugnant to, the Act and the two can stand together [92]. Per [94]-[95], the claimant's points that the Act makes no provision for derogation and that section 54 omits the references to consent found in other sections were found unpersuasive, and sections 54 to 54B do not extinguish the possibility of a strip search on terms as to the sex of the officer that are otherwise lawfully agreed between the officer and the person searched.
• para-93 — Limits of the conclusion: strip searches only; intimate searches left open : Per [93], the court's conclusion 'is therefore limited to the position in relation to strip searches which, absent consent, are authorised by sections 54-54B and Annex A to Code C'. The court expressed no view on intimate searches or the effect of the expansive terms of section 55(7), which provides that a constable may not carry out an intimate search of a person of the opposite sex, because intimate searches are not the subject of the guidance; the court observed that the detailed terms of section 55 and other considerations may support a different conclusion for that type of search [93]. Per [4], an intimate search involves physical examination of an orifice other than the mouth. Per [48]-[52], section 55 prescribes who may authorise and carry out such searches and includes the opposite-sex prohibition in section 55(7).
• para-11 — Gender Recognition Certificates and For Women Scotland assumed, not decided : Per [5], the claimant contended, and the NPCC and BTP did not dispute, that following For Women Scotland Ltd v Scottish Ministers [2025] UKSC 16 'sex' in this context means biological sex regardless of whether the person has a Gender Recognition Certificate. Per [11], the court noted that For Women Scotland was specifically about the Equality Act 2010, queried whether the position under PACE of a person with a certificate might be different, and was told that neither side submitted it is different or invited a decision; the court therefore proceeded on the basis that the guidance does not differentiate between people with and without certificates, made no decision on the effect of a certificate in this context, and assumed without deciding that the parties' agreed position on the effect of For Women Scotland in the context of the 1984 Act is correct. Per [100], the judgment keeps open the question of the effect of For Women Scotland in this context.
• para-80 — Human Rights Act 1998 and Convention arguments not decided : Per [78]-[79], both sides pointed to human rights implications: the claimant relied on Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention being capable of engagement by strip searching, and the defendants emphasised the dignity of the transgender person and that an officer who does not wish to carry out such a search is not obliged to. Per [80], neither side suggested that the Convention or the Human Rights Act 1998 requires a particular result, neither submitted that a same-biological-sex requirement, or the ability to agree to a search by a person of a different sex, is compatible or incompatible with the Convention for a transgender detained person, and it was therefore unnecessary to determine the issue. Per [100], the court made clear that it had not determined any argument under the Human Rights Act 1998.
• para-97 — Late application by the Good Law Project to intervene refused : Per [97]-[101], a letter from the Good Law Project dated 22 June 2026, which reached the judge on 29 July 2026 after the draft judgment was circulated, asked to intervene to argue that For Women Scotland does not establish that 'sex' in the 1984 Act means biological sex and that the court should consider section 3 of the Human Rights Act 1998. The judge refused: the application came too late, the parties would wish to respond, and the judgment keeps open the effect of For Women Scotland and decides no Human Rights Act argument [99]-[100]. The decision would have been the same had the letter arrived sooner [101]. In the event of an appeal, the Good Law Project may apply to intervene in the Court of Appeal [101].

When relevant

Relevant when a police force, custody provider or other body with PACE search functions asks whether consent can lawfully allow a transgender detainee to be strip searched by an officer of a different sex: the High Court held, for strip searches under sections 54 to 54B of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, that in principle it can, where consent is genuine and the search is lawful in all other respects [86], [88], [95]. It is the only judgment in the catalogue on same-sex searching in custody. It decides nothing about the Equality Act 2010, single-sex services or facilities, the effect of a Gender Recognition Certificate, intimate searches under section 55 or the Human Rights Act 1998 [11], [80], [93], [100]. A single High Court judgment, persuasive on other High Court judges and binding on lower courts. Decision support, not legal advice.