Sex Matters v The Mayor and Commonalty and Citizens of the City of London [2026] EWHC 149 (Admin)

In brief

The Administrative Court refused permission for Sex Matters, a charity, to bring judicial review of the City of London Corporation's admission arrangements for the Kenwood Ladies' Pond and the Highgate Men's Pond on Hampstead Heath [1], [3], [68]. Since at least 2017, in the court's words, both biological women and trans women have been permitted to swim at the Ladies' Pond, and both biological men and trans men at the Men's Pond [5]; the Corporation was consulting on a future policy and did not intend to await final EHRC guidance [14], [15]. Permission was refused for two reasons given separately: the claim was premature and out of time because the Corporation had made no fresh decision and was part way through a consultation [34]-[40], and the County Court, with an individual claimant, was the appropriate forum for a claim under section 29 of the Equality Act 2010 [47]-[65]. The court did not decide the grounds on direct or indirect sex discrimination and said that determining them would be of limited value because the issues are fact and context specific [66], [67]. The court did not decide whether the arrangements comply with the Act [66]. On 16 March 2026 the Court of Appeal (Elisabeth Laing LJ, on the papers) granted permission to apply for judicial review, holding it arguable that the judge was wrong on delay, prematurity and standing, and the claim returned to the Administrative Court (order CA-2026-000233; also reported in SEXMATTERS-DPP-EWHC-2026 [100]).

Key provisions

• para-34 — Premature: no fresh decision while the Corporation consults : Per [34]-[37], the Corporation had not made a fresh decision amenable to judicial review but was in the process of doing so, so the claim was premature; the substantive arrangement had been the same since at least 2017 and the 16 July 2025 decision merely continued it pending consultation [35]; the challenge was an attempt to limit the options in the consultation and it would be contrary to good administration to allow it at that stage [36]. Per [39]-[40], it was particularly inappropriate to allow a challenge out of time while the decision-maker was itself undertaking a complex process, and an extension of time was refused; the rule of law could be vindicated by an in-time challenge to a fresh decision.
• para-47 — Standing and alternative remedy: the County Court and an individual claimant : Per [47], section 114(1)(a) of the Equality Act 2010 gives the County Court primary jurisdiction over claims about the provision of services under section 29, an alternative remedy expressly contemplated by Parliament. Per [55]-[62], the more appropriate claimant is an individual who says they were discriminated against, a direct discrimination claim requires a comparison between individuals, the County Court is better placed to decide the facts, and the group's inability to claim there supports the view that judicial review is not the appropriate remedy. Per [63]-[64], an interest group in a discrimination claim is less likely to have standing than a community group in a planning case, and the Equal Opportunities Commission in the EOC case had a statutory interest. Per [65], the court concluded the County Court is the appropriate forum, independently of its conclusion on prematurity.
• para-66 — The grounds were not decided; limited value for other contexts : Per [66], in light of the preliminary issues it was not necessary to consider the merits of the grounds (sections 13 and 29, and section 19, of the Equality Act 2010 [3]) in any detail, though the court thought they were not so obvious or overwhelming as to outweigh the prematurity point. Per [67], the issues are fact and context specific, so determining the grounds would be of limited value in different contexts. Per [68], permission to bring judicial review was refused.
• para-5 — The arrangements described by the court : Per [5]-[7] and [13], since at least 2017, in the court's words, both biological women and trans women have been permitted to swim at the Ladies' Pond and both biological men and trans men at the Men's Pond, with a separate Mixed Pond open to anyone; the court notes that the ponds are not identical, and that there was some disagreement between the parties about the configuration of the facilities at the Ladies' Pond [6]. The court adopted its own shorthand for 'trans women' and 'trans men' as people who identify in the opposite gender, without distinguishing those with a Gender Recognition Certificate [4].
• para-40 — Effect of FWS and EHRC guidance left to the Corporation : Per [8], the court summarises For Women Scotland as holding that trans women with a Gender Recognition Certificate did not fall within the definition of 'women' in the Equality Act 2010. Per [15] and [40], the Corporation did not intend to await final EHRC guidance, and to the degree FWS has changed understanding of the effect of the Act that would be an important element of the Corporation's decision-making, which the court did not wish to pre-empt.

When relevant

Relevant mainly when someone cites this judgment for a proposition about the Equality Act 2010, because it decides none: it is a permission refusal on prematurity, delay, standing and alternative remedy [66]-[68], and the Court of Appeal later held each of those conclusions arguably wrong and granted permission (order CA-2026-000233, 16 March 2026). It is not authority that a provider part-way through a consultation is shielded from challenge, and it is not a merits ruling on single-sex services. Decision support, not legal advice.