University of Bristol v Miller [2026] EAT 84

In brief

The Employment Appeal Tribunal upheld an Employment Tribunal's finding that a university professor's dismissal was direct philosophical belief discrimination, unfair and wrongful, with a 50% reduction for contributory fault in the unfair dismissal complaint, and remitted one remedy issue [173], [181]. The EAT held that the tribunal had been entitled to find that the claimant's beliefs about political Zionism, as he defined them (that it is inherently racist, imperialistic and colonial and ought to be opposed [25]), were protected philosophical beliefs under section 10 [138]-[139]; that a political belief can qualify [138]; and that dismissal was because of manifestations of that belief [141]-[143]. A material part of the reason for dismissal was the non-objectionable expression of the belief, so the direct discrimination could not be justified [151]. Separately, the claimant's comments about students and student groups were not manifestations of the belief and were properly treated as blameworthy conduct [142], [151], [175]-[176]. In case it was wrong, the EAT held that the tribunal's application of Bank Mellat proportionality, finding that a warning and not dismissal was the less intrusive means, was within the legitimate parameters of judgment [152]-[154]. The University did not suggest he was antisemitic or dismissed him for breaching the Equality Act [29], [139].

Key provisions

• para-138 — A political belief can be a protected philosophical belief; the Grainger bar is low : Per [138], the University conceded that political beliefs can in principle be protected; a protected belief need not be a fully fledged system of thought, may relate to a single issue, and need only affect a single but important aspect of a person's life (Gray v Mulberry, Grainger). Per [138](iv), whether the beliefs are right or wrong is not the issue. Per [139], applying Forstater at [79], the tribunal did not err in finding that the beliefs crossed the low bar of Grainger V as worthy of respect in a democratic society; the tribunal had found the claimant opposed the exclusive realisation of Jewish self-determination in a land with a large non-Jewish population, not Jewish self-determination as such, and was not supportive of violence as a means of opposing Zionism [139].
• para-141 — Causation: the reason for dismissal was a composite of belief and non-belief factors : Per [141]-[143], the tribunal had to find the thought processes of the decision-maker and decide whether a material part of the reason was the manifestation of the protected belief; it correctly directed itself on the Higgs requirement of a sufficiently close and direct nexus between belief and manifestation [143(i)]. Per [142], two material factors operated cumulatively and were separate and distinct parts of a composite reason: the expression of his anti-Zionist beliefs, and the comments about students and student groups. Per [143(iii)], the tribunal applied the section 13 'because of' test and not 'but for' causation, and per [143(vi)] it could properly consider how the decision-maker would have reacted if the statements had not contained the anti-Zionist content.
• para-151 — Non-objectionable expression of a protected belief cannot justify dismissal; remarks about students were separate : Per [149]-[151], the tribunal did not identify any aspect of the expression of the beliefs to which objection could justifiably be taken; the elements it found culpable were only those directed at students and student groups. So a material part of the University's composite reason for dismissal was simply the non-objectionable expression of a protected belief, an act of direct discrimination that could not be justified under Higgs, and the student remarks were neither expressions nor manifestations of the beliefs relied on, so the Higgs justification question did not arise for them. Per [175]-[177], the finding that some conduct was misconduct was not itself discrimination, and Professor Banting's recommendation of disciplinary proceedings was not harassment, because the concern was separate from the manifestation of the belief.
• para-152 — Proportionality: Bank Mellat balancing applied; a warning was the less intrusive means : Per [152]-[154], if the justification question did arise, the tribunal's self-direction was clear and accurate, the University did not challenge its conclusions on 'prescribed by law' and 'legitimate aim', and the tribunal had applied the proportionality guidance in Bank Mellat and the Higgs list. It concluded on rational grounds that a less intrusive means than dismissal could have been used, such as a warning with clearer standards on what was acceptable [153]; the appellate role is to check the self-direction and whether the result was within the legitimate parameters of judgment (Shvidler) [154]. Per [118]-[120], the EAT sets out the four Bank Mellat questions and the Higgs factors, including content, tone, audience, power imbalance and whether the limitation is the least intrusive measure.
• para-157 — Unfair dismissal: a proportionality finding informs the band of reasonable responses : Per [157]-[160], not every discriminatory act is a repudiatory breach, but a finding that a dismissal was a disproportionate means of pursuing a legitimate aim can assist to a significant extent in answering the section 98 band of reasonable responses question; the tribunal did not substitute its own view. Per [168]-[169], the 50% reduction for contributory fault was a matter of judgment for the tribunal as an industrial jury, and Hollier category three was open to it.
• para-172 — Polkey chance not sufficiently explained: remitted : Per [172], the EAT could not see on what basis the tribunal concluded that there was a 30% chance of a lawful dismissal because of the August 2023 posts, given the equivocal evidence about them; on that single point ground 9 succeeded, and per [181] paragraph 9 of the tribunal's judgment was set aside and the issue remitted to the same tribunal.

When relevant

Disciplinary or dismissal decisions where an employee has expressed a protected belief in public or on social media, the line between the belief and its objectionable manifestation, and how an employment tribunal applies Higgs and Bank Mellat to a sanction [138]-[154]. It is an anti-Zionism case and concerns neither gender-critical beliefs nor trans people. It is relevant to the toolkit because it applies the framework in HIGGS-CA-2025, which the toolkit uses for belief-based conflicts with inclusion policies, and shows a tribunal's and the EAT's treatment of mixed-reason dismissals and of the less-intrusive-means question. Decision support, not legal advice.