MB v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions, Case C-451/16
On a reference from the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom, the Court of Justice (Grand Chamber) held that Directive 79/7/EEC precludes national…
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- Citation
- Case C-451/16, ECLI:EU:C:2018:492
- Jurisdiction
- EU
- Year
- 2018
- Status
- Persuasive
- Certainty
- Modified By Statute
In brief
On a reference from the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom, the Court of Justice (Grand Chamber) held that Directive 79/7/EEC precludes national legislation which requires a person who has changed gender not only to fulfil physical, social and psychological criteria but also to be unmarried to a person of the gender acquired, in order to claim a State retirement pension from the pensionable age applicable to the acquired gender. MB, to whom the Court refers as she, had not obtained a full gender recognition certificate under the Gender Recognition Act 2004 because, as the law then stood, that required her marriage to be annulled, and her claim to a pension from the age of 60 was refused because, without a full certificate, she could not be treated as a woman for the purposes of determining her pensionable age ([17]-[19]). The Court reasoned that the rule treated a person who changed gender after marrying less favourably than a married person who had retained their birth gender, that the two were in comparable situations because the contributory pension was granted irrespective of marital status, and that this was direct discrimination on grounds of sex ([36]-[48], [52]). The United Kingdom's aim of avoiding marriages between persons of the same sex could not justify the rule, because direct sex discrimination under the Directive may be derogated from only in the situations the Directive exhaustively lists, and the pensionable-age derogation in Article 7(1)(a) does not allow this difference in treatment ([49]-[51]). The Court also stated that EU law does not detract from Member State competence over civil status and the legal recognition of a change of gender, which must nonetheless be exercised in compliance with EU non-discrimination law, and it made clear that it was not deciding, generally, whether legal recognition may be made conditional on annulment of an earlier marriage ([27], [29]).
Status and dates
Reference made by the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom by decision of 10 August 2016, received on 12 August 2016. Hearing 26 September 2017; Opinion of Advocate General Bobek delivered 5 December 2017; judgment of the Grand Chamber 26 June 2018 (ECLI:EU:C:2018:492). MB applied for a State retirement pension in 2008 on reaching 60; the application was refused on 2 September 2008, and her challenge was dismissed by the First-tier Tribunal, the Upper Tribunal and the Court of Appeal before the reference ([18]-[20]). Statutory context stated in the judgment: under the Gender Recognition Act 2004 as then in force, a married applicant could obtain only an interim gender recognition certificate ([11], [13]). The Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Act 2013, in force from 10 December 2014, amended section 4 of the 2004 Act so that a full certificate must be issued to a married applicant if the spouse consents; that Act did not apply to the dispute ([15]). The pensionable ages at [7] (60 for women born before 6 April 1950, 65 for men born before 6 December 1953) relate to those cohorts only. Line of authority: the Court relies on Richards (C-423/04) at [29], [35] and [51], and on K.B. (C-117/01) at [30]; both were also relied on by the Secretary of State before the referring court ([23]). Later case law: the Court has cited [29] in Mirin (C-4/23, 4 October 2024, at [53]) and in Shipova (C-43/24, 12 March 2026, at [37]). UK status: a CJEU judgment given before 1 January 2021 is assimilated EU case law, but only so far as it relates to assimilated law (European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018, s.6(7)); whether a ruling on Directive 79/7 still does so is open to argument and should be confirmed with advice before reliance. If it does not, the ruling would not bind any court in Great Britain. Where it does, courts below the Court of Appeal are bound on the meaning of unmodified assimilated law (s.6(3)); the Supreme Court is not bound (s.6(4)(a)); the Court of Appeal is not bound except so far as binding UK case law decided after 2020 has modified or applied it, and it applies the Supreme Court's test when deciding whether to depart (s.6(4)(ba); SI 2020/1525, regs 3 to 5). Northern Ireland: Directive 79/7/EEC is one of the six directives listed in Annex 1 to the Windsor Framework, whose Article 2(1) non-diminution commitment is given effect by s.7A of the 2018 Act; Article 13(2) requires provisions referring to Union law to be interpreted in conformity with relevant CJEU case law. How far that brings this ruling to bear on rights in Northern Ireland is contested, and should not be presented as settled either way. Great Britain: For Women Scotland Ltd v The Scottish Ministers [2025] UKSC 16 held that 'sex' in the Equality Act 2010 means biological sex. MB interprets an EU social security directive, not the 2010 Act, but its treatment of a person by reference to acquired gender sits in tension with that reading.
Key provisions
- paras-27-31 — Member State competence over civil status, subject to non-discrimination : The Court was asked only about entitlement to the State retirement pension, not, generally, whether legal recognition of a change of gender may be conditional on annulment of an earlier marriage ([27]). Although EU law does not detract from the competence of the Member States in matters of civil status and legal recognition of a change of gender, they must exercise that competence in compliance with EU law, in particular the principle of non-discrimination ([29]). The Court recalled from K.B. that national legislation making eligibility for a pension benefit subject to a civil-status condition cannot be placed outside the principle of non-discrimination on grounds of sex in workers' pay under Article 157 TFEU (in K.B., Article 141 EC) ([30]), and held that Article 4(1) of Directive 79/7 must likewise be complied with when Member States exercise their civil-status powers ([31]).
- paras-34-38 — Directive 79/7 covers discrimination arising from gender reassignment : Direct discrimination has the same meaning under Directive 79/7 as under Article 2(1)(a) of Directive 2006/54 ([34]). Following Richards, the scope of Directive 79/7 extends to discrimination arising from gender reassignment. Although it is for the Member States to establish the conditions for legal recognition of a change of gender, for the purposes of the Directive persons who have lived for a significant period in a gender other than their birth gender and who have undergone gender reassignment surgery 'must be considered to have changed gender' ([35]). The pension rule treated a person who changed gender after marrying less favourably than a person who retained their birth gender and is married, and that treatment is based on sex ([36]-[38]).
- paras-39-48 — Comparator: situations need not be identical, but only similar : Comparability does not require situations to be identical, but only similar, and is assessed specifically and concretely in the light of the subject matter and purpose of the rule. Because the 'Category A' State pension is granted on reaching pensionable age to anyone with adequate contributions, irrespective of marital status, a person who changed gender after marrying and a married person who kept their birth gender are comparable. The United Kingdom's emphasis on marital status made an irrelevant factor decisive, and the aim of avoiding same-sex marriage is unrelated to the pension scheme. Hämäläinen v Finland was distinguished as concerning legal recognition of gender in civil status, not pension entitlement.
- paras-49-52 — No justification outside the Directive's express derogations : The United Kingdom argued that avoiding marriages between persons of the same sex justified the annulment requirement. The Court held that derogation from the prohibition of direct sex discrimination in Article 4(1) of Directive 79/7 is possible only in the situations exhaustively set out in the Directive; the aim invoked matched none of them, and the pensionable-age derogation in Article 7(1)(a) does not allow Member States to treat persons who changed gender after marrying and married persons who kept their birth gender differently with regard to the age of entitlement to a State retirement pension (citing Richards) ([51]). The legislation was direct discrimination on grounds of sex and prohibited by the Directive.
- operative-part-1 — Operative part : Council Directive 79/7/EEC of 19 December 1978 on the progressive implementation of the principle of equal treatment for men and women in matters of social security, in particular the first indent of Article 4(1), read in conjunction with the third indent of Article 3(1)(a) and Article 7(1)(a) thereof, must be interpreted as precluding national legislation which requires a person who has changed gender not only to fulfil physical, social and psychological criteria but also to satisfy the condition of not being married to a person of the gender that he or she has acquired as a result of that change, in order to be able to claim a State retirement pension as from the statutory pensionable age applicable to persons of his or her acquired gender.
When relevant
Cite when explaining that EU sex-equality law in state social security reached less favourable treatment of a person treated as having changed gender, even where full legal recognition was withheld because of a marriage condition, the Court's comparator test that situations need not be identical 'but only similar' ([41]), assessed against the subject matter and purpose of the rule ([42]), or the principle that direct sex discrimination under Directive 79/7 cannot be justified outside the Directive's express derogations. Use with care in Great Britain after For Women Scotland, and treat any Northern Ireland application as an open question.
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