Authority catalogue v1.13.298 data current as of

Citation
[2025] EWCA Civ 1662
Jurisdiction
England & Wales
Year
2025
Status
Primary
Certainty
Settled

In brief

The Court of Appeal dismissed Allison Bailey's appeal against the EAT, and in doing so put on the record, in the plainest words any appellate court has used on the point, that belief protection under the Equality Act 2010 runs in both directions. At [93] Whipple LJ said the two sides 'both hold strong views which are diametrically opposed' and that 'Both sets of beliefs warrant protection under the 2010 Act'. The court also endorsed the EAT's observation that Kirrin Medcalf, the Stonewall employee who complained about Ms Bailey's tweets, 'was only expressing his own beliefs', beliefs which the EAT had said were themselves likely protected. The case is relevant where an organisation's inclusive stance, or an individual's trans-positive or gender-identity belief, is attacked as merely 'political', 'ideological' or 'activism' rather than as a protected belief. It speaks, symmetrically, to the questions people actually ask: is being trans-positive a protected belief; where does an organisation stand when its inclusion stance is called ideological; and does gender-critical belief protection cut both ways? On the authorities: the gender-critical belief was found protected by the ET, applying Forstater, and that finding was not challenged [13]; for the belief in gender self-identity, this judgment says only, in a passage it treats as not material to the outcome, that both sets of beliefs warrant protection [93], without analysing s.10 or applying a protected-belief test. It did not decide that question. The most important limit is that this is the belief leg only. A trans person's own protection does not rest on belief and never needs to: it rests on being (s.7 gender reassignment, a fact-based characteristic requiring no belief, no certificate and no medical step) and, where held, on legal status under the Gender Recognition Act 2004. The belief leg is additional armour, and its distinctive value is for allies, colleagues and organisational stances: the people who have no s.7 leg to stand on. In the toolkit's view, describing a trans person's identity as a belief would repeat, in mirror image, the very error of reframing identity as ideology. The symmetry proposition here is persuasive endorsement rather than ratio, and organisations do not themselves hold protected beliefs: s.10 attaches to individuals.

Key provisions

When relevant

Reach for this record whenever belief protection is being claimed in ONE direction only. Typical triggers: an organisation's trans inclusion policy, EDI stance or public position is challenged as 'political', 'ideological', 'activism' or 'Stonewall-captured'; an employee, ally or manager faces a complaint, grievance or disciplinary step over trans-positive expression; a complaint founded on a protected belief is itself being treated as misconduct; a competing-rights or coexistence output needs to state the legal position even-handedly rather than defensively. Also relevant to the drafting of codes of conduct, social-media policies and complaint-handling procedures that currently name only one belief as protected. Use alongside FORSTATER-EAT-2021 (belief protection established), HIGGS-CA-2025 (holding versus manifesting), BAILEY-STONEWALL-EAT-2024 (the reasoning below) and BAILEY-ET-2022 (the first-instance findings). CRITICAL FRAMING LIMIT: this record answers belief questions. It is NOT the authority for a trans person's own protection, which rests on s.7 being and, where held, GRA 2004 status — never on belief.

Contains information licensed under the Open Justice Licence v2.0.